

Nigeria's Northeast Economy and the Challenges of Transnational Terrorism: Study of Islamic State in West African Province

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Abstract

Nigeria's economy is boosted by several micro-economic activities within and across the northeast, particularly the Lake Chad axis as well as other regions. The country is blessed with numerous natural endowments, huge populations and there are many private and corporate businesses promoting economic stability, growth and developments. Paradoxically, the emergence of terrorists' groups and subsequent capture of Lake Chad by Islamic States in West African Province (ISWAP) possess a new threat to Nigeria's quest for food security, socioeconomic activities, human lives and trans-border commercial activities, sources of revenue, foreign exchange and attracting of foreign investors into the northeast. The paper concluded that transnational terrorism is threat and major impediment to the economy of northeast Nigeria, as well as other countries sharing the Lake Chad Basin. Strong bilateral and multilateral military synergy, financial backing, provision of functional/modern equipment, recruitment and deployment of both conventional and non-conventional security operatives, among others are recommended as the panacea for securing the region, revamping and sustaining its economy.

Keywords: Northeast, Transnational Terrorism, ISWAP, Socioeconomic Activities & Lake Chad.

Introduction

Nigeria is one of the naturally endowed nations in Sub-Saharan Africa with huge population of able-bodied young men/women; arable land for socioeconomic and trans-border commercial activities. Beside the large land, the Lake Chad basin is another vital asset that does boost the economy of the northeast. She serves as source for agricultural activities, has the potential to cater for the food and animals need of the people in Nigeria and the members of the Lake Chad Commission and beyond. Lake Chad Basin is significant to the economy of nation-states like Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and others in Central African Republic for a very long time and provides great sources of international nexus for the mentioned countries. To this end, the study reviewed the concept of terrorism, transnational terrorism, how they affected some socioeconomic activities in the northeast and the Lake Chad axis in particular and outlined some recommendations.

Statement of the Problem

In spite of large arable land in northeast Nigeria, water from the Lake Chad Basin for agricultural and trans-border socioeconomic activities in the past at both local and

international levels, the activities of transnational terrorists' in and beyond the geopolitical zone seems to be posing a monumental threat to personal, state and international socioeconomic activities, growth and development even when some observers thought the nation's security operatives have crushed the terrorists.

Objective of the Study

The objective of the study is to critically examine the ways and manners by which Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) affected the economy of Northeast Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarifications

Terrorism

The Latin verb 'Terrere' which means "to frighten" according to Nwogwugwu, Alao and Ekpendu (2018) gave the English word Terrorism that is derived from "terror" its origin and bearing. Some people on a general term see terrorism as 'the unlawful or threatened use of violence by non-state actors against individuals or property'. From a survey, Schmid and Jongman (1988:28) gave an elaborate and all-encompassing definition thus:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual; group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. The threat and violence based communication process between target (organization), (imperiled) victims and main target (audience), turning into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.

Describing terrorism from African perspective, Maiangwa (2014:28) states that: "Terrorism in the African context implies the application of intensive pressure by individuals or groups on governments by the use of force (which may include the use of arms) especially when all openings for democratic expressions and legitimate agitation and ways of seeking redress are blocked. Those regarded as terrorists use excessive force though not legitimate means to attract government attention to the need of the populace".

Deducing from the above, one can say that terrorism is a violent tactics by state or non-state actors for political rationale against non-combatants, principally to instill fear in order to generate or send a message. It is also viewed as an avenue by aggrieved person(s) or groups to get attention or recognition by the state on their demands. To an *outsider*, or non-members, the attitude of this group is terrorism but those inside it only see it as the best way to express their grievances and demand reform or call for dialogue. Each of these groups therefore sees terrorism from different perspectives. For instance, in present North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, the struggle for self-determination can be called terrorism by those in power while to those liberators; they are only fighting for self-determination.

Ender, Sandler and Gaibulloer (2010:6) define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national groups against non-combatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims”.

Terrorists’ acts can therefore be broken into domestic and international /transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is the terrorist activities that are basically organized and carried out by local or domestic terrorists’ groups and targets the local population. The domestic aspect involves perpetrators, victims and audience from purely the host country. Transnational/International terrorism concerns and includes the perpetrators and the victims from two or more countries. Transnational terrorism could also occur when the terrorists plan or strategize an attack in one country and execute it in another country or use its affiliate to execute its desire elsewhere; assisting with ideas, personnel, weapons, finances, etc. (Enders & Sandler, 1991).

Both domestic and international/transnational terrorists use bombings, hostage taking, assassinations, suicide bombings, arson and armed assaults to cajole governments into their socio-political and economic demands in response to public/audience pressure.

Modern era of transnational terrorism that is orchestrated by organized armed groups have aggravated the anxieties and uncertainties of both individuals and sovereign nation-states globally since 1968 (Gaibulloer, Sandler & Sul, 2013). The attack on World Trade Centre (WTC), New York in the United States (US) by Al-Qaeda on 11th September, 2001 which recorded huge casualty figures and destroyed properties kept the world confused and apprehensive. This well organized, coordinated and executed plot by hitherto despised aggrieved groups or persons have opened a new debate; broaden the horizon, interest on the capacities and abilities of both domestic and transnational terrorists’ organizations across the globe (D’Anieri, 2010).

Consequently, several terrorist organizations have sprang up in several parts of the world for various reasons, claiming nexus with the well-known similar or sister groups existing within and outside Africa and other continents. There are other militant/terrorists’ groups like Al-Qaeda in Iran/ Islamic State of Iran and the Levant (ISIL); Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (MIFM); Maoists (India); New People’s Army (NPA); Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; Terik-i-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP), among others (Maiangwa, 2014). Some of these groups are able to carry out their activities within their respective nation-states single handedly or in collaboration with other related groups across their strongholds or breeding states (Buba, 2017).

Transnational Terrorism

Transnational actors according to D’Anieri, (2010:353- 354) “are actors whose activities cut across state boundaries, especially non-governmental actors”. Based on the above description of an international and transnational actor, there are many organizations whose activities either for good or for bad takes place across sovereign nation-states; including terrorists’ groups who recruit personnel, obtain weapons, solicit and transfer money,

establish camps and carry out training across states, regional and continental boundaries successfully. Consequent upon the above, both state and non-state actors are living in fear and anxiety due to the existence and use of sophisticated weapons by such groups.

Global political economy which encompasses or refer to all socio-political and economic activities in and across the sovereign nation-states, is shaped and influenced by both internal and external forces like nature of the various states' leadership, security and insecurity, natural disasters, domestic and international terrorism, among others (Baily, 2010). Since September 11th 2001 attack on the United States of America (USA) by Al-Qaeda, national and international socioeconomic activities and political relations have not remain the same in various nation-states and in the international arena. The activities of terrorists' organizations and the claim of fighting against terrorism has spread widely even to developing democracies and economies of Africa and to Nigeria in particular.

National political economy includes both the formal and informal socioeconomic and institutional activities operating in and across national boundary. Where the government is directly or indirectly involved in the production and distribution of scarce resources on its territory, as well as providing/ensuring the security of lives and properties, and sustaining the enabling environment for both individual and organizations within and outside the country to setup and pursue their businesses and live peacefully without any apprehension or attacks. Nigeria, like other countries in sub-Saharan Africa is facing transnational terrorist activities orchestrated by Boko Haram, cum Islamic States in West African Province (ISWAP). The afore-mentioned groups are transnational terrorist organizations in Nigeria's northeast boundary paradigm, with their training camps in some parts of Cameroon and Chad; their sources of income and weapons cut across beyond the shores of Nigeria (Festus, 2014).

Terrorists' organizations like Transnational Corporations (TNC) have tentacles, adherents and sub-groups across the continents of the world for similar and other related purposes. In Africa for instance, there is the Al-Qaeda network in the African Maghreb that have served as sources of propaganda, recruit for the known Al-Qaeda operating elsewhere and Al-Shabab. International interaction according to Johari (2012:432) "is the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries with at least one actor who is not an agent of a state government or an international organization". This description focuses and involves non-governmental organizations, private individuals and their groups involved in the transfer of goods, money, credit, information, etc from one country to another. Both state and non-state actors can and are involved in such international interactions (Johari, 2012).

Transnational terrorists' activities involve the organization and execution of attacks by terrorist groups, both within their own states on foreign nationalities. They can cross their immediate neighbours' border to carry out attacks or collaborate with other sister organizations to carry out attacks on their perceived common enemies and, in some cases facilitate the process of weapon acquisition, training of personnel and other logistics. Boko Haram attack on the United Nations building in Abuja on 26th August, 2011, abducting

foreign nationalities working in Nigeria, crossing over to Chad, Cameroon and Niger to carry out attacks, establishing a training camp outside the shores of Nigeria makes the Nigerian breed group to become a national and transnational terrorists' group.

Transnational terrorism is also divided into state and non-state actors/terrorism. State transnational terrorism is the terrorist activities orchestrated by one sovereign country against another country or its leaders; or state supporting terrorist in other sovereign states like Russia in Ukraine. Non- State terrorist groups are groups that have affected national and international actors or personalities for whatever reasons. Example of such groups includes Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the Basque Homeland and liberty (ETA) in Spain, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hamas in Gaza and former Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Most literature sees the aforementioned and others as transnational terrorists organizations, while Boko Haram/ISWAP were mostly conceived and treated as domestic terrorists groups/organizations, hence, little is written for Boko Haram/ISWAP as transnational terrorists, the missing gap in knowledge that this study attempt to fill.

Methodology

Secondary source of data was adopted. That is, relevant information from academic books, Journals, Monographs and other internet materials were reviewed before drawing inferences.

ISWAP as Transnational Terrorism

Boko Haram which started sometimes in 2002 in Maiduguri, had major clash with the Nigerian security operatives which claimed lives and properties. The group has graduated from being a local insurrectionary group to a terrorist group with international affiliations whereby it established links with various terrorists' formations like Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda of Mali in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (Fineman, 2018).

Boko Haram leadership is said to have established links with the Algerian Salafist Group, later known as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Magreb (AQIM) since 2004. This group gave training on combat and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). From the training acquired in AQIM, it was gathered that members of Boko Haram were able to show dexterity in handling of weapons and manufacture of what is called 'dirty bombs' through IEDs. Supporting the above, Mbaegbu (2018:235) states:

Compounding the situation is the rising radicalization and the southward migration of terrorists and extremists, particularly members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), through the Sahel towards Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Indeed, there are indications that AQIM has operational bases in some West African countries and has forged tactical alliances with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and Ansar Eddine in Mali and Niger. These alliances have taken the form of AQIM's provision of training and logistical support to Boko Haram and other terrorist operatives.

To practically confirm its association with foreign terrorist group on 7 March 2015, the then Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), headed by Abu Al-Baghdadi. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) originated as Jamma'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999 and pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. She participated in the Iraqi insurgency following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by western forces at the behest of the United States and proclaimed itself as worldwide caliphate, thereby referring to itself as Islamic State (Cook, 2014). As a caliphate, it claimed religious, political and military authority over all Muslims and captured many places in Iraq and Syria before it was defeated. This group was also known for its video postage on beheading and other types of executions of both military and civilian population.

The confirmed affiliation or nexus between Boko Haram and ISIL gave or metamorphosed and upgraded Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, popularly called 'Boko Haram' to its new status and name as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (abbreviated as ISWAP). This implies that Boko Haram is beyond the shores of Nigeria. It is now upgraded to a West African militant group, with transnational capacities. Though based in north-east Nigeria, the group is also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon Republics. Affirming with the above, Tamba, (2015:26) states that 'initially confined to Nigeria, Boko Haram/ISWAP has been extending its activities around Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics, wreaking havoc on some communities in the region'. Boko Haram/ ISWAP has become connected, having membership in the mentioned states, besides its allegiance to ISIL (Elbagir, Cruickshan & Taweefee, 2015).

Some impact and evidence of the group's alliance with more established international terrorist groups were the good quality of snapshots or pictures and video messages the group are posting on Youtube. They now launched several attacks on the military bases in Baga, Gubio and Lake Axis without much fear and collecting several weapons, etc. (Searcey, 2019 and Forest, 2012).

Paradoxically however, after the allegiance to ISIL, there was perhaps internal friction among the Boko Haram Commanders and the ISIL leadership on another hand which prompted one faction to break away. On 3rd August 2016, the Islamic State reported in the 41st issue of its newspaper, al-Naba, that Abu Musah al-Barnawi has been appointed as the new leader of their West African branch. Today, there are two different factions of the transnational terrorists' groups. Al-Barnawi, that is backed and connected to ISIL leads ISWAP, while the initial and most popular one in Nigeria, Boko Haram is still headed by Abubakar Shekau (even though both leaders are said to have been killed). Whichever of the group attacks, it is labeled as Boko Haram. Both of them have the mission of establishing caliphate in Nigeria and beyond.

There are however some slight differences between the two groups which are: Shekau's faction (Boko Haram) take harder lines on who is an apostate Muslim and therefore deserving death while the ISWAP headed by Al-Barnawi seems to be moderate. Secondly, Al-Barnawi considers the population in particularly Borno and Yobe states to be Muslims while Shekau conclude the populations, who don't belong to their sect, are non-believers.

Thirdly, Boko Haram in 2014 abducted 276 Chibok school girls in Borno state and released few in exchange with some of its foot soldiers; while, ISWAP in 2018 abducted 110 school girls in Dapchi, Yobe state and returned all, except Leah Sharibu, who refused to renounce her faith in Christ Jesus (this may attest to their radical and moderate stand). Fourthly, Boko Haram attacks indiscriminately, while ISWAP target security forces. Fifthly, Boko Haram seems to be more proactive in Sambisa/Adamawa axis, while ISWAP is along the Lake Chad axis. Both of them are however deadly and have strongholds in and outside northeast Nigeria.

Consequently, other scholars and researchers have corroborated that Boko Haram/ISWAP have become international and transnational terrorist groups (Olumba, & Ekeanyanwu, 2016 and Batolotta, 2015). To Onuoha (2011), however, "Globalization, which has enhanced the movement of goods and people across borders, has equally facilitated the activities of criminal groups" across borders. Globalization increased the desire of the terrorists to reach to a wider audience thereby facilitating the creation of fear to a greater magnitude. Globalization, from Onuoha's (2011) perspective, not only "facilitated the activities of criminal groups" but also reinforced linkages of terrorist groups like Boko Haram, ISWAP, Al-Shabbab and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISWAP is today internationally recognized as leading terrorist groups in the world operating in and across the Nigerian northeastern boundary paradigm, encroaching into Niger, Cameroon and Chad respectively. They have accounted for the death of uncountable souls from 2009 (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Ekpendu, 2018).

Nigeria's Northeast Economy

Nigeria is a country in Sub-Sahara Africa that got her independence from Britain in 1960, with basically three regions, North, South and West. Later the regions were broken into 12, 19, 21 and currently 36 states respectively; with the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Nigeria started with parliamentary system of government from 1960-1966 and later changed to presidential system of government from 1979 to date (2023), besides the military incursion for several years (Hamidu, 2010). The thirty-six states are clustered into geopolitical zones of which the north-east is one of them. Nigeria, along its north-east region shared common borders and commercial activities with some countries like Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Guinea both on land and sea shores, and by implication, share common challenges. The Central African sub-region of Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, as well as Sao Tome and Principe are countries that harbour huge area of strategic concern to Nigeria as it cut across Lake Chad Basin in the hinterland to the gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic sea bed (Umara, 2014). The sub-region is an area that impinges on several vital aspects of Nigeria's national interest among which are: The Lake Chad Basin, shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Central African Republic. It is a home to about 22 million Nigerians whose livelihood is anchored on the Lake and its resources. A huge stake now threatens the steady

flow in modification by the upstream sectors of the Lake and the consequent plan for inter basin transfer project.

Originally, the Lake Chad basin covers an estimated area of 427,000km² (Hall, 2009) but Agamal, (2011), notes that climate change and uncontrolled competition over water resources coupled with series of migrations; exerts pressure on water resources in Lake Chad leading to its depletion and near extinction. The basin's water resources of about 37,000 km² in 1963 has reduced to 25,000 km² in 1973 and further reduced to 2000 km² at present primarily due to unsustainable utilization and management occasioned by the fact that the basin belongs to four different countries namely: Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

Umara, (2014) wrote that the Lake Chad is immense in surface area and is the fourth largest inland water body on the African continent with several countries at both West and Central Africa utilizing it for multifarious purposes. Among the countries using or directly benefiting from the Lake Chad include Chad, Niger, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan, Cameroon, and Libya. Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon are among the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). In Nigeria, the basin covers an area of 178,500 km² encompassing six different states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Jigawa, Kano and Plateau. Out of the five swampy areas of the region – the Yaeres, River Fitri, Massenya, Salamat and Komadugu Yobe – only the last one falls in Nigeria. The basin has more than 600,000 hectares of wetland which makes it the highest producer of livestock, legumes and freshwater fish in the country (Vassolo, 2012). Nigeria and Nigerians are and have benefited from irrigation and other agricultural activities from Lake Chad. Decree number 32 of 1973 of Nigeria led to the establishment of the Chad Basin Development Authority (CBDA) to boost food security, covering an area of 136, 000 square kilometers.

The North and Central Africa outlet of Nigeria's import and export is hampered by the challenges in some of these countries. The principles of good neighbourliness are the cardinal objectives of Nigerian foreign policy since independence. Nigeria's good neighbourliness principle focuses on both the West and Central African sub-region because of geostrategic location of the country. Despite its proximity to both regions, much attention is focused on West Africa by foreign decision makers than Central African sub-region. Owing to the connectedness of socioeconomic commercial activities between and across the African countries in and beyond the sub-region; Nigeria and other policy makers are expected to have more interest in the events along their common borders. Terrorist groups do exploit such vulnerable and poorly manned places to keep their terrorist activities going.

Central African sub-region is a conduit route for cross border trade as many countries in the sub-region rely on Nigeria's facilities for their import and export business. The region is also African's flash point that experienced civil strife with its corresponding impact on cross border militia and weapons infiltration that threatened Nigeria's security. There is the interplay between events in each of the countries and its neighbour's economy; which prompted Northedge (1968) to call it the description of 'the interplay between the inside

and outside'. The closure of Nigeria's borders in the northeast due to security concern and its impacts on Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic and Niger are sufficient indicators of interplay between the inside and outside. This resulted on the internationalization of Nigeria's security problem as it affects the states that relied on its facilities. Owing to Nigeria's strategic location and market, decisions taken, like the closure of the border and the frequent transnational terrorists attacks have impacts on other countries.

The Geopolitics of Lake Chad is economically strategic in, and for Nigerian internal and external, vis-a-vis food security for national and regional development in numbers of ways.

1. **Provision of Fisheries:** Lake Chad is known for its fishing viabilities. It is estimated that from 1969 to 2010, 1.7 million tonnes of fish have been landed, resulting almost entirely from skilled and native fishing operations. Fisheries production for the year 2001 in the Lake Chad Basin was estimated at 68, 784 tonnes. Fish is an important part of diet for most people in the Lake Chad Basin providing an essential supply of protein. Nigerian and other nationalities get these from the Lake Chad (Yerima & Hamidu, 2020).
2. **Employment Opportunities:** As at 1990, the World Bank reports that the annual population growth in the Lake Chad area ranges between 2.5 and 3% and the total population has increased by 11.7 million since 1990 (World Bank, 2002). Nigeria, being the most populous country hosts about 59% of the total population living the region according to Umara (2014). Owing to the water in the Lake Chad, people around the region engage in catching of fish and other sea foods, smoking it (local method of preservation); securing and selling of firewood to the fish or other sea food preservers; hunting of other bush meats like grass cutter, grasshoppers other microeconomic activities for daily needs like food stuff and medical care for the population. There are farmers who cultivate crops like wheat, rice, maize, onion, etc, taking advantage of the Lake and its tributaries. These activities serve as employment opportunities for large number of people, mostly from Nigeria and other neighbouring countries.
3. **Promoting of Animal Husbandry:** Besides the fisheries and other sea food, cattle, camels, sheep, goats are also important sources of food (meat, milk, and butter). They are used for ploughing (cultivating and weeding of land/grasses). These animals also produce manure which is used as organic fertilizer on farms. Taking advantage of the Lake Chad possibly made Borno state in northeast Nigeria to be one of the largest producers of livestock in West African sub-region. Owing to the availability of grasses, water and absence of pests, these attract the pastoralists, facilitate the multiplication of animals like goat, sheep, camel, cattle, and also boost the economy of the owners who sell the manure, meat, hide and skin (Yerima & Hamidu, 2020).
4. **Boosting of Commercial Activities:** Commercial activities along and in the Lake Chad area prosper, like buying and selling of the fish caught and smoked are being conveyed from the Lake Chad to Maiduguri, and particularly in markets/motor parks like Muna and Baga garages. These places record behalves of socioeconomic

activities due to the proceeds from Lake Chad; and the transportation of the goods to other parts of Nigeria. Corroborating with the above, Okechuku (2005:17) observed that: "the Muna Market in Maiduguri on the Lake Chad littoral, annually provides large volumes of smoked fish which supplies protein needs to south eastern Nigeria, in exchange for palm oil, Gari (or fried cassava powder), yam, shoes, as well as plastic products from Aba, Enugu and Onitsha". There are also vehicles that convey these items directly from north to eastern Nigeria, thereby developing economic activities along the border towns and in offloading states and stations.

5. **Sources of Revenue:** The Nigerian state both at micro and macro levels get revenue from the imports and exports, taking place along and across Lake Chad Basin area and at the offloading markets in some eastern states in Nigeria. The cattle transported and other items from the Lake to other parts of the country boost the revenue generation of the Federal, States and Local governments involved.

The afore-mentioned are some of the benefits and interests of Nigeria in and on the Lake Chad (Umara, 2014). Whatever affects those vital interests, affects the Nigerian economy and that of other nation states. The peaceful nature of the Lake Chad basin promoted both national and international/transnational socioeconomic and trans-border commercial activities.

Impacts/Effects of Transnational Terrorism on Northeast's Economy

Nigeria's economy is supported and sustained by socioeconomic activities in the various geopolitical zones, based on their peculiarities and endowments. Nigeria's northeast hitherto booming and flourishing is paradoxically affected. The capture of the Lake Chad axis by the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) terrorists and the establishment of their stronghold therein assisted the transnational terrorists' in numbers of ways and affected the northeast and transnational socioeconomic activities thus:

1. **Sources of weapons:** Owing to the strategic nature of the Lake linking various countries, the import of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) from other countries into the area makes it easy for ISWAP and other individuals/groups to be in possession of arms and ammunitions. Consequently, the group is made stronger and, in some instances, renders the Nigerian state powerless due to efficacy and preponderance of such fire arms power at their disposal. In line with the above, Umara (2014) posits that the smuggling and weapon by such non-state actors led to states collapse in many countries among which include Central Africa Republic; Liberia; Sierra Leone; Rwanda; Democratic Republic of Congo; Mali; Libya, to mention but a few.
2. **Acquiring of more foot soldiers:** Capturing of such strategic spots assist the transnational terrorists not only to have more weapons, but ability/access to import and export more foot soldiers and other mercenaries, as well as meet other economic needs of the transnational group. It then became clear that the Lake Chad axis which boost or should boost Nigeria's economy is now used as a transit route for arms

supply, acquiring of more foot soldiers, establishment of more training camps for the terrorists, etc (Ojudu, 2005).

3. **Halting and disrupting socioeconomic activities:** The transnational terrorist activities in the Lake Chad area have practically affected the Nigerian economy. For instance, the fishermen/women using the Lake Chad basin and other water tributaries were attacked and some killed by the transnational terrorists. This caused those fishermen and women to be in the hideout for their lives, hence the scarcity of fish for local and international consumption ensued. Further still, consequent upon the capture of the Lake Chad axis by the ISWAP, also caused the shortage of cattle, hide and skins and other items from the Lake Chad axis or from Nigerian neighbours to Maiduguri and to other parts of the country. It is upon such short supplies that the price of the commodity has soared higher. Many local fishermen and women, livestock breeders and pastoralists lost their animals to the terrorists who collected them by force (Ibrahim & Idris, 2015).
4. **Structural unemployment:** The capturing and subjugation of the Lake Chad by ISWAP led to structural unemployment. Some of the workers or self-employed people in the Lake Chad lost their lives; others left the place to other safer places thereby causing structural unemployment to millions of persons in north-east Nigeria. For instance, several hunters of bush meat, grasshoppers and fishermen/women have been forced to stop going out to the bush to hunt and water side to do their legitimate business for the same purpose. Fishermen/women are afraid of fishing around the Lake Chad because when the terrorists capture some of them, they collect their goods, money and some even killed. Many of farmers, business peoples' live stocks died for lack of food and care. This was due to the inability of the herders and other care-giver to go out as at when due for grazing/herding (Ejike, 2015).
5. **Displacement of persons:** The capture of the Lake Chad by ISWAP caused displacement of people and forced migration for ones' safety and security. As a result of such displacement and forced migration, several towns along and around the Lake Chad Basin and axis have become ghost towns because of transnational terrorist attacks or frequent seizure of the residents' properties (Hamidu, 2017). This is a monumental threat to the socioeconomic development of individuals and corporate organizations/institutions in and around the region.
6. **Retarding of international socioeconomic activities:** Owing to the capture of the Lake Chad basin, Nigeria's trade with some of its immediate neighbours like Chad, Cameroon and others in Central Africa Republics, using the Lake Chad and other routes like Maiduguri-Gamborun/Ngala to Cameroon and beyond; Bama-Baki route and Mubi-Sahuda-Cameroon routes, where Nigeria get not less than N141, 138, 262, 90 (one hundred and forty one million, one hundred and sixty two naira, ninety kobo) as at 2004, was an eye sore due to transnational terrorists activities along and across these routes (Customs Department Bulletin, Maiduguri, 2004). The local industries in

Kano and Aba, among others; exporting their goods through the Lake Chad were also halted. This affected the Nigerian home base industries/factories turn-over, staff buoyancy and revenue to the state, among others.

7. **Closure of road networks:** Movement of goods and services are part of socioeconomic activities in any society. As a result, free flow of goods and service boost economy, while the reverse also affects the economy. Northeast share boundary with other countries both in the west, north and leading to the central Africa n republic. Owing to the incessant attacks by transnational terrorism however, military authorities often block or closed several roads for security reasons. Some business and flourishing roads were closed. Among those notable roads closed were Maiduguri/Damaturu; Maiduguri/Mubi; Maiduguri/Biu; Bama/Mubi; Biu/Garkida, etc. These roads are vital to socioeconomic and political activities in the northeast. The closure of the roads is not limited to local roads, but it also involved the international ones. The international routes from Bama/Banki to Cameroon and Gamboru/Ngala to Cameroon, all the way to Central Africa Republic, as well as the one around the Lake Chad were also closed from 2015-2019. Such closure is sometimes abrupt which retard transporters and affect the supply of some essential goods, food items or the conveying of other items from or through such places. As a result of such sudden and frequent closure, many commercial and socioeconomic activities suffered set back in the northeast Nigeria (Bamidele, 2012).
8. **Breaking of some financial institutions in the northeast:** Financial institutions, most especially banks were affected by the transnational terrorists' activities. Transnational terrorists have attacked and broken the safe of banks in remote areas in most of the frontline states in places like Mubi, Hong, Michika, Madagali, Gwoza, Bama, Gwoza, Bama, Mafa, New Marte, Dikwa, Gamboroun/Ngala, among others. Owing to such financial and material loses, many banks either completely or partially left some localities for the insecurity caused by Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorism. Such unfortunate incidences created room for unnecessary travelling, and withdrawing of money by people in and from the areas. For instance, many civil servants, business men/women from affected areas and environs travel to Azare in Bauchi and Gombe states among other places to cash their salaries or get money for their business. Some of such bank customers encounter several challenges and some even die in the process (Mohammed, 2014). In Adamawa state, people from the northern senatorial zone have to come to Yola, the state capital for monetary transactions. These have adversely affected socioeconomic and commercial activities in the three states and by implication the nation at large. When the situation was a bit improved, some of the financial institutions open for business from 9 a.m to 12 noon or 1p.m for customers. This led to a large concentration of persons in the banking hall within those hours. As cautionary measure also, several banks refuse to be stocking their Automated Teller Machine (ATM) with money for fear of being broken. This has affected the exchange of goods and service as people lack cash at hand; and being in

the bank hall for long hours was risky also (Anthony, 2015 and Anumudu, 2015). There are however some recuperations now.

9. **Halting of electricity supply:** Electricity/power supply serves several functions and supports numerous socioeconomic activities at both individual and organizational levels. Apart from the industrial purposes and home uses, it helps to boost microeconomic activities that are essential for the economy (tailors, welders, handset chargers, computer shops, ice cream makers, fish, fruits and other basic food preservations). As a result of terrorist attacks/activities, many electric poles, cables/wires, and stations that supply power in most places in northeast Nigeria were destroyed. Consequently, there are no electric energy for example in city like Maiduguri, Bama, Gamborun, Madagali, Michika, Gulani, and other local government areas for months/years. This led to or caused high demand for fuel to meet one's services/needs; and the use of generators caused noise and environmental/ air pollutions. Since 2017 upwards, there are some improvements on those amenities.
10. **Halting of agricultural activities:** Northeast Nigeria is known for agricultural activities in view of the large arable farmlands. In Borno, Yobe and Adamawa micro states for instance, wheat, rice, maize, beans, benne seed, onions, groundnut, grain, fish, cattle, goats, donkeys, etc are produced and reared in large quantities from those places and transported to other parts of Nigeria and others are exported to Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Central Africa Republics. However, such economic fortunes are affected because many villages and local government areas were captured by the terrorists. Consequently, this ancestral and legendry occupation was halted as numerous agriculturalists were particularly disturbed by the displacement from their farm lands. Many farms of wheat, rice, maize, beans, and onion were destroyed; some were burnt while others looted by the transnational terrorists. Corroborating the above, Haruna (2015) reveals that in 2013, more than 19,000 wheat farmers in Marte LGA of Borno State could not harvest their crops due to attacks by Boko Haram terrorists and they have not been able to return to the farm again since then. Agreeing with the above, the then Managing Director of Chad Basin Development Authority (CBDA), Dr. Garba Abubakar disclosed that 5,000 hectares of wheat under the South Chad Irrigation Scheme Programme (SCISP) of the Authority were cropped in 2013, but the farmers could not finish the harvests due to the activities of the insurgents which forced the farmers to abandon 3,500 hectares of wheat which was pilfered by stray animals and thieves. Many farmers were attacked and others killed by the transnational terrorists who made them to avoid going to the farms. Even up till 2023, there are some villages and farm lands in some interiors in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states that cannot be ploughed, cultivated and harvested by farmers for fear of the transnational terrorists.
11. **Killing of Nigerians and other citizens:** Transnational terrorism orchestrated by ISWAP has caused the death of many people in northeast Nigeria. Many farmers, businessmen and women, school teachers, students, security operatives and other

ethnic and foreign nationalities coming into or passing through the northeast or in the Lake Chad for businesses purposes were killed. For instance, it is estimated that over 35,000 persons were killed (Aljazeera, May, 4th, 2022). That was why Hamidu (2022) noted that the killings/murder by ISWAP affected socioeconomic activities and the economy in the Chad basin, northeast states and the Nigerian state at large negatively. As a result of such attacks/killings in the areas, many business and occupation now lack manpower/apprentices, and other private companies and business have closed. Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorism is a threat to lives, business and socioeconomic activities in the northeast Nigeria and particularly in the Lake Chad axis, the stronghold of ISWAP. Since it is only the living that will do business and engage in agricultural activities, other people ran away from those vulnerable places and forsake doing businesses in those troubled spots for their safety and security. Even though socioeconomic activities is recuperating in the northeast and around the Lake Chad basin, there are still apprehension, anxiety and uncertainties as the transnational terrorists' sometimes launch surprise attacks in and along the major routes, around the Lake Chad and in some remote communities.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Socioeconomic activities at individual, national and regional levels in the northeast and particularly along and across the Lake Chad basin were negatively affected by the activities of transnational terrorism. Transnational terrorism has proven to be a major setback and possess a new challenge to the quest for food security, revenue generation or sources of foreign exchange, and attracting of foreign investment into the northeast in spite of the large arable land, huge enterprising young men and women, large quantity of natural endowments. Terrorism orchestrated by ISWAP can be said to be one of the monsters affecting socioeconomic stability, growth and development in northeast and the nation at large. The panacea for halting the excesses of transnational terrorism in northeast include but not limited to:

- a. There must be serious understanding and a strong nexus by and from those countries in the Lake Chad Commission. A strong international and united resolution against the transnational terrorists is needed to turn the tide. Unfortunately, however, each of the states has serious internal economic and terrorists' challenges confronting them;
- b. The affected countries in the Lake Chad must unite and seek foreign aid to get money so as to meet the logistics, feeding, surveillances and other allowances of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) they formed against Boko Haram and ISWAP. Poor incentives and lack of equipment for and by the international military alliance will hinder their synergy and operations against the transnational terrorists in this sub-Saharan region;
- c. Each state is to arise to the new challenges posed by ISWAP in its states. At individual and international states' levels, there should be thorough investigations of ISWAP's

training camps, sources of income, mercenaries, etc of the group and then capture/halt them at national and multinational military levels;

- d. Authorities in and of Nigeria should recruit and send more security operatives in and to the affected places. Furthermore, the local citizens can be mobilized, oriented, empowered and deployed for security purposes. The local hunters, vigilante groups, Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF) residing and doing businesses in the areas can be identified, screened and enlisted to serve as local security officers and be guided by the conventional security personnel. Because these local security volunteers know the terrain and their local environments, they will assist to a greater extent and their presence will help the farmers and other microeconomic businesses to be protected and sustained, and,
- e. Government should encourage the agriculturalists-farmers, fishermen/women and other business people in and around those affected places with soft loans and other incentives to make them revive their businesses for personal and international socioeconomic development. As a popular adage says, 'an idle man/ woman, is the devil's workshop'; economically empowered and employed or positively engaged youths/persons, will hardly be free to be recruited and be used by criminal elements or terrorists. The state should therefore create, sustain and protect job opportunities for the teaming youths in and around the Lake Chad and northeast states of Nigeria. These among others things if done with and in good spirits, will reduce the negative access and excesses of the transnational terrorists on the nation's economy and will in turn boost the economy of Lake Chad, northeast states and that of Nigeria at large.

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